Re: Opening Hawley's WSJ piece

[cld@xxxxxxxx (Carl Distefano)]

Reply to note from "J. R. Fox"  Thu, 18 Oct 2001
17:08:30 -0800

> Thanks to Morris, no longer an issue.

Yes, kudos to Morris for providing the best format of all -- text.
I took the liberty of smoothing over some of the OCR rough edges,
below.

--
Carl Distefano
cld@xxxxxxxx
http://users.datarealm.com/xywwweb/

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The Wall Street Journal, Thursday October, 17 1991, page A23:

Innovation a Casualty at IBM
Counterpoint By John B. Judis

 This newspaper often argues that buyouts are beautiful,
but that is not always the case. Once upon a time there
was a software programmer who worked for ATEX, a Bedford,
Mass., maker of word processing equipment. David Erickson
wrote ATEX's programs for big mainframe computers, but in
1982 he bought one of IBM's new personal computers. Mr.
Erickson did not like the text editor, Edlin, that was
included with the machine, so he decided to write his own.
In June 1982, he finished the program and called it
XyWrite. Together with another employee, John Hild, he
decided to set up a new company XyQuest, to sell the word
processor.

 From the beginning, XyWrite was the most sophisticated
word processor on the market. XyWrite II, which Messrs
Erickson and Hild brought out in May 1983, had features,
such as automatic footnoting and two on-screen windows,
that would not become among IBM word processors for
another three years. Written in assembly language - the
code computers themselves speak - XyWrite was also the
fastest word processor available. Newspapers and magazines
began using XyWrite including the New York Times, Boston
Globe, and the New Republic and two of the principal
computer journals, PC Magazine and PC Week. The editors of
this newspaper also use the program for writing and word
processing.

 But XyWrite never became a best seller like WordPerfect
or Microsoft Word. For one thing, it was difficult to
learn. To use XyWrite, one had to memorize commands (such
as "type," "call" and "save") that were to be written on a
command line rather than chosen from a menu. Journalists
weren't intimidated, but some secretaries were. For
another reason, XyWrite had the charm, but also the
fallibilities of a small business run by MIT techies
rather than M.B.A.s. Customers who called for technical
support would sometimes find an obliging Erickson on the
other line but the product's reputation depended largely
on word-of-mouth.

 It was too bad, because by 1989, Mr. Erickson was working
on XyWrite IV, which promised once more to put XyWrite
ahead of the field. Mr Erickson figured out a way to allow
on-screen editing of text that combined different fonts
and graphic images without sacrificing speed. And he also
set up a menuing system for XyWrite that made it easier to
use. But Messrs. Erickson and Hild knew that unless they
found a way to market the new product, it would remain a
niche product, treasured by aficionados, but ignored by
the greater computing public.

 Then along came IBM. Since its amazing success with the
PC, IBM had a number of flops or semi-flops, from the PC
Jr., to the OS/2 operating system. Its word processor was
one of the least nimble on the market. Written by
committee, Display Write 5 requires a gargantuan 10
megabytes of disk space, yet lacks the speed and features
of its competitors. For instance, a Display Write user
could not see the bottom of one page and the top of the
succeeding [page] on the same screen.

 IBM knew it needed a word processor that could compete
with Word Perfect and Microsoft Word, and XyQuest knew
that it needed marketing power behind its software.
XyQuest had been scheduled to release XyWrite IV in Spring
1990, but in April it joined hands with IBM to produce a
new word processor. For IBM, it was an unusual
arrangement. Big Blue stepped back and gave Mr. Erickson
and XyQuest responsibility for writing the new program -
to be called Signature and to be modeled on XyWrite IV.
And it assigned Signature to a new Desktop Software Group,
based in Milford, Conn., giving the group a wide latitude
in bringing Signature to market.

 IBM and XyQuest previewed it at a Boston Computer Society
meeting this March and sent out test copies that drew
praise. It was said that the new word processor would be
released to the public in the second quarter. Meanwhile,
IBM's Desktop Software Group released the program's code
to third-party developers, encouraging them to write
programs that would augment Signature's power. This wasn't
unusual; it was unprecedented. IBM seemed to be returning
to the free-wheeling, hands-off strategy that had
produced the first PC. But then darkness descended on
Milford.

 The second quarter of 1991 came and went without
Signature appearing. Finally, as pressure mounted from
disgruntled third-party developers and from XyWrite users,
who had already waited more than 18 months for an upgrade
to XyWrite III Plus, IBM and XyQuest disclosed that the
product would be released Sept. 17. XyQuest planned to
send upgrade notices on Friday, Sept. 13. But it was
not to be. At the last moment, IBM announced that it was
indefinitely postponing the program's release. IBM
officials said they had to reorganize and re-evaluate the
work of the Desktop Software Group, but they acknowledged
that there was no problem with the product.

 Some say Signature may be sold to another computer
company. Asked about the future, IBM spokesperson Keith
Mary Rantas yesterday had no comment. She said, "the
signature announcement is on hold." In the end - as reported
in this newspaper - IBM decided to disband the Desktop
Software group.

 Officials at XyQuest were predictably worried when I
phoned them. "We've had apprehensions from the first,"
XyQuest's Vice President James Adelson admitted. Mr.
Adelson said that if necessary, XyQuest was prepared to
distribute Signature themselves. Third-party developers
were livid. One software executive said, "If worse comes
to the worse, we'll file a class-action suit against IBM
because we all did this on promise that there would be a
product. "

 The XyQuest story might still have a happy ending. But
this would be difficult; the computer software business
lives on constant updating - old software dies. Describing
the disbanding of the Desktop Group, this newspaper's
reporter noted that this step would have little impact on
IBM's bottom line. But if IBM does finally abandon
Signature, and XyQuest is forced to market it, this will
be another example of how the culture of the large
corporation cannot accom[m]odate innovation. Large
companies are best at winning market share and at mass-
producing semiconductors and circuit boards; small are
best at designing hardware and writing software.

 When large companies have tried to write software by
committee, they have ended up with monstrosities like
Display Write or dBase IV, version 1.0. There are
exceptions. Borland and Microsoft are large companies that
write good software, but they are run by programmers who
recreate within their companies the freedom and
individuality of the small start-up like XyQuest, while
maintaining a unified vision of their operation.

 Last year, when IBM signed up XyQuest to write its own
software and set up a quasi-independent Desktop Group, it
seemed to be heading in this direction. But in the end,
IBM and XyQuest's partnership turned out to be another
blind alley for innovation.

 Mr. Judis is a contributing editor of the New Republic
and correspondent for In These Times.